The History of Bolivia:

Bolivia became an independent nation on August 6, 1825. It lies in the very center of South America and, at the time of its independence, was approximately the size of Mexico. Geographically, it was (and continues to be) a fragmented country. One chain of Andes crossed it north and south approximately one hundred miles from the Pacific Ocean and separated the rest of its territory from this one outlet to the sea (due to territorial losses, Bolivia is now landlocked.) A parallel chain lies another one hundred and fifty miles to the east. This chain separates the Altiplano, a high plateau, from a vast lowland that is a part of the Amazon basin in the north and a scrub wasteland called the Chaco in the south.

During its colonial period, Bolivia was one major focal point of Spanish interest in the New World (the other was Mexico). This is because huge deposits of silver were discovered in and around Potosi, a region in the eastern chain of Andes. The colony was governed directly by representative of the Crown in Spain, and thus, colonial Bolivians had little experience with self-rule. Not surprisingly, the economy was based on the extraction of silver. Ruling Spain inherited from the Inca Empire dominance over two indigenous groups, Aymara and Quechua Indians, who were organized into communal settlements and accustomed to serving a distant imperial government.

A highly stratified, two-class society developed. Criollos (Bolivian born individuals of Spanish decent,) a small minority of the population, were dominant. They controlled mining, the haciendas (large feudal land holdings,) and other supportive industries. Andean Indians, the large majority of the population, were subordinate and supplied labor in both the mines and the haciendas.

The hacienda system was the antithesis of the communes left behind by the Inca. Although both were ways of organizing peasants in the rural areas, haciendas usually displaced communal lands, and when they did so, commune members became colonos, a status that indentured them to the hacienda. Thus, the hacienda system was as much a means of obtaining and holding a supply of labor as it was a system of distributing land to white owners. There is a zero-sum relationship between the two systems. As the number of haciendas grew, the number of communes shrank. However, because Bolivia was distant from Spain, had a geography that prohibited easy travel and trade, and had a tantalizing and concentrated source of wealth, most of the territory remained uninhabited by Europeans. Thus, Indian communities survived in much of its territory (About two-thirds of Bolivian Indians still lived in communes in 1825.)

To Beginning

I. Caudillo Rule: 1826 - 1880

Bolivia was the last major South American country to achieve independence (1826.) Upon independence, Bolivia organized itself as a republic that limited political participation to literate, property-owning, white males. Its first constitution created a governmental divided into four branches; the executive, a tricameral legislative, the judicial, and the electoral. However, this cumbersome government quickly deteriorated and the country was ruled by military caudillos - military strongmen.

Like many newly independent ex-colonies, Bolivia’s economy was dependent on the export of a single raw material. In this case it was silver. Its economy was not geared to supply many its domestic needs; instead it depended upon imports for these items. However, its silver industry was already in decay at the time of the war of independence. This trend was only accelerated during the 15-year struggle. Due to a weak international silver market and the disruptions of war, there was an 81% decline in silver production between 1803 and 1840. By the end of this period, 10,000 silver mines had been abandoned even though the majority could have been productive. Potosi had been the largest city in the new world in 1650 (with a population of 160,000.) By 1835 it had a mere 13,000 inhabitants.

The Bolivian economy stagnated along with this decline and remained in the doldrums during the much of the 19th century. As silver diminished in importance, criollos, with both mining and land interests, placed greater emphasis on plantation life. They retained their dominate position in society and the Indians continued to live in communes or on haciendas. No matter where the Indian lived, he was exploited. Colonos were virtual slaves on the hacienda. They were required to provide labor, seed for hacienda fields, and even transport the harvest to market. In exchange, they were allowed to work a small plot for their own subsistence. Communal Indians were free of such obligations. However, they were required to pay a head-tax, which was the most important source of government income during much of Bolivia’s early history. In 1846, communal head-tax made up 43% of government revenue, mining contributed a mere 11%.

The focus of the country did not change following independence. In spite of the economic doldrums, life continued to revolve around the silver mining region of Potosi. Sucre, the nation’s capital, was near Potosi, but given its lower altitude, had a more pleasant climate. It was where the haciendas of the Potosi mining interests were located. La Paz, an important population center in Bolivia’s northwest, was distant from Sucre and Potosi but was more accessible to Peru, the Pacific, and the outside world.

To Beginning

II. Conservative Rule: 1880 - 1899

As the last quarter of the 19th century approached, several factors created pressures that challenged Bolivia’s existing order. One source of pressure arose in the Littorál. The Littorál is a desert region that runs along the Pacific coast of South America. It was important to Bolivia because it was its only direct outlet to the sea. However, in the latter half of the 19^th century, it became important for another reason. In its extremely arid climate (although adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, the Atacama Desert is one of the driest regions on earth,) huge deposits of guano formed from the droppings of sea birds that lived along the coast. In the latter half of the 18th century, these nitrate-rich deposits became valuable as a means of replenishing Europe’s depleted soil. Thus came a "guano boom." However, the Bolivian oligarchy stubbornly focused on mining. It was Chileans that exploited the Littorál’s wealth. Tension mounted between the two countries, and finally the War of the Pacific erupted in 1879. Bolivia lost the Littorál in the war, and with it, its only access to the sea (as well as the large deposits of copper in the region.)

This loss had a lasting impact on Bolivia.  It left the country landlocked and heightened its isolation. Anger and hostility over the "loss of the sea" persisted long after the conclusion of the war. Whether it should sue for peace or renew the war was a major issue during the late 1800s. Access to the sea continues to be a concern even to the present day. However, in spite of ample warning, the country had been ill prepared for the war.

A second event also put pressure on Bolivia’s political system. There was a renewed European demand for silver starting in the 1870s. Thus, concurrent with a struggle with Chile (and perhaps diverting attention from it), the country underwent a second silver boom. The rebirth of the Bolivian silver industry did not result in any major social change. The same landed/mining oligarchy that had controlled the country since its independence took advantage of the boom. However, a better transportation system was now needed to haul silver from the mines to the Pacific, and the silver barons looked to government to provide it.

The inability to address these demands as well as the failure in the war undermined the credibility of the military caudillos. Although the same oligarchy continued to dominate in Bolivia, there was a major transition in the way the country was ruled. Elected civilians replaced military strongmen as the country’s leaders. Although Bolivia’s constitution has undergone numerous changes throughout its history, by 1880, it had assumed a form that it roughly follows today. Government consisted of an executive elected to four-year terms and a bicameral legislature elected every two years. When no candidate won an absolute majority of the popular vote, the president was selected by the legislature.¹

Even though, the government had assumed a democratic structure, only a small portion of the population (the traditional oligarchy) participated in elections. There was much violence and fraud during elections and the incumbency advantage usually determined their outcome. Although a legislature was elected, met, and passed laws, the president generally ignored it. Although civilian rather than military, strongmen still ruled Bolivia.

A rudimentary party system also developed as a part of this transition. The traditional oligarchy divided into two factions - Liberals and Conservatives. Liberals wanted government to take an active role in development and to continue the war with Chile. Conservatives wanted a minimum of government intrusion. The rhetoric aside, little actually separated the two parties. Participants from either party were from the traditional oligarchy and had economic interests tied to both mining and the hacienda. Even the government-shunning conservatives wanted to protect Bolivian territorial integrity and to assure that silver could be effectively exploited. Thus, there were only shades of difference between the two. Illustrating this, it was the Conservatives who built the railroad that brought Bolivian silver to the Pacific coast.

In spite of the new pressures and demands, the transition in 1880 did not signal a general desire for change. It occurred because most Bolivians wanted a government that could more effectively resist the changes occurring around them. After long economic stagnation, they wanted to enjoy the wealth that was once again flowing into the country, and a renewal of hostilities with Chile would have interrupted this flow. The Liberals wanted to renew the warfare, but the Conservatives were more willing to sacrifice their pride for the unimpeded flow of silver. They wanted peace with Chile.

Furthermore, the Liberals wanted the government to be a driving force for economic development. However, the extraction of silver was a relatively simple process. Other than transportation, the industry had little need for government. The structure of elite interests remained simple as well. It did not need a government to mediate its interests. The Conservatives were willing to develop a railroad that specifically accommodated silver’s needs,² and otherwise, to leave the economy and society pretty much alone. Thus, capturing the mood of the country better, the Conservatives held power during the last two decades of the 19^th century.

However, another set of economic events occurred in the final decade of the 1800s that would bring more significant change. Following the world depression of 1890, the demand for silver began to decline. The Bolivian silver industry once again languished. From an average annual value of 15.4 million Bolivianos (Bs) in 1895-99, the average annual value of silver production plunged to 3.8 million Bs between 1910-14. At the same time, there was a growing demand for tin. Tin, which had been an unimportant by-product of silver production, began to challenge it in importance. In the early 1890s, Bolivia produced only 1,000 tons of tin annually. By the turn of the century, it had climbed to 9,000 tons; tin production had become Bolivia’s dominant industry.

This is somewhat ironic. Tin and silver are usually found in the same deposits. During the silver booms of the past, tin ore was often discarded as waste. To a large extent, the Bolivian tin boom arose from the slag heaps of the silver mines. Its average annual value was 16.9 million Bs during 1900-04. This represented over 50% of the value of all Bolivian exports. By 1910-14, the average annual production was valued at 52.0 million Bs, and during 1915-19 it climbed to 80.5 million Bs. Tin production did not reach its peak until 1927.

To Beginning

III. Liberal Rule: 1899-1920

Thus, at the turn of the century, there was a major transition in the Bolivian economy that was strongly influenced by external factors. As silver faded in importance, tin, buoyed by strong international demand, rapidly rose to dominance. There is a significant difference in these two industries. Tin is more expensive and difficult to mine; tin mining requires major infusions of capital and technology. Furthermore, tin must be marketed in greater quantities to be profitable and thus requires cheap, efficient transportation to get it from mines to refineries to the manufacturer.

The economic transition that took place in Bolivia was no simple replacement of one dominant product for another. It created demands that Bolivia and rudimentary transportation and financial infrastructures were ill prepared to meet. The national capital, Sucre, was isolated from La Paz, the country’s major commercial center, as well as from other regions of the country and from the outside world. In a manner reminiscent of their behavior during the guano boom, the old, land/silver barons adamantly maintained their focus. In an effort to buoy up an industry that was dying due to forces beyond their control, they continued to invest in silver. Their efforts merely depleted their capital and prevented them from turning their attention to tin.

The above factors combined to cause major changes in Bolivian society. A new, tin-based oligarchy emerged rapidly. Only one silver family, the Aramayos, survived the transition to become a major participant in the new industry. Carlos Aramayo’s holdings accounted for approximately 25% of Bolivia’s tin output. The two other "tin barons" were newcomers. Mauricio Hochschild, accounting for another 25% of tin production, was from Europe. Simón Patiño, accounting for almost 50% of production, was a white-collar mining employee of indigenous/Spanish origin. This new oligarchy developed strong ties with major world financial and industrial centers in its successful effort to exploit tin.

This transition brought political change. The Conservatives, who had monopolized political power during the last two decades of the 19th century, were allied with the traditional silver/landed elite. Meanwhile, the "rosca," a class of managers, technicians, and operatives grew up around the upstart tin oligarchy and came to dominate the more progressive Liberal Party. The Liberals wanted to move the capital to La Paz, a place better positioned for the more cosmopolitan needs of tin. The Conservative government refused to move it. The Liberals advocated federalism, which would allow greater autonomy to Bolivia’s various regions. The Conservatives advocated a centralized government. Even though the Conservatives had started the development of a system of rails, the focus had been on the needs of silver. The Liberals emphasized the need for an integrated, national rail system.

In 1898, the tension between these two parties erupted into a civil war. The Liberals won and retained power until 1920. There is little of a political nature to distinguish this era from its predecessor save for the party in power. During the civil war, the Liberals promoted themselves as the party of federalism, universal suffrage, honest elections, good government, the redistribution of land, and the re-conquest of the Littorál. However, once in power most of this was quickly ignored. Land reform was never seriously entertained. Government centralization and limited political participation appeared much more palatable from the perspective of one holding the reins of government. Thus, electoral reform and federalism were never seriously pursued. In 1904 the party reversed itself on the Littorál. It signed a treaty ceding the region to Chile for an indemnification of £300,000. In a surprise move during the same year, a major portion of Bolivia’s large territorial claim in the Amazon basin was ceded to Brazil for £2,500,000.³ The much-awaited government clean-up never materialized.

As in the preceding period, elections were held on a regular basis, but they did more to announce the continuation of the liberal/tin hegemony than to determine an electoral outcome. Fraud, violence, and the advantages of incumbency kept the Liberals in power. Thus, the liberal regimes that held office between 1899 and 1920 were similar in nature to the regimes of the preceding period; civilian strongmen set the course of politics.

But there was one difference that did distinguish the two parties. The Liberals not only expressed the belief that government should play a stronger role in development, they acted on it. Much was accomplished. The central government was moved to La Paz⁴ and a modern administrative structure was developed. A central bank was created. Railroads were built connecting La Paz with other domestic centers such as Oruro, Potosi, and Cochabamba and connecting Bolivia to the Chilean ports of Antafogasta and Arica.

Major socio-economic changes took place during the era. Even though there were recessions in 1907 and 1913, the two decades were marked by rapid economic growth fueled by the tin boom, the development of the railroads, and the modernization of government. A managerial/technical class emerged along with a European style, industrial labor force. Unions came into existence as early as 1905. In spite of this, there was little unrest as there was a ready supply of jobs and advancement for the nascent working class.

Although the period was ushered by tension between a declining old and an ascendant new elite, the wounds between these groups quickly healed. Wealth and steadily-expanding opportunity fueled this coming-together. Over time, the new rosca and the older oligarchy became indistinguishable as they intermarried and developed intertwined connections in the military, government, mining, and on the haciendas.

But not all groups fared well during the twenty years. As new members joined the Bolivian elite (and wanted land) and the demand for agricultural products to feed burgeoning middle and working classes grew, incursions into communal lands became more frequent. By 1920, accessible communes were all but eliminated. The communal Indians were not the only group to suffer. With their new-found wealth, Bolivians began to buy foreign goods. This spelled depression and ruin for artisans and existing domestic industries.

In general, then, the 1900 - 1920 period saw the emergence of a powerful tin triumvirate that had strong connections with the international community. It also saw the emergence of managerial/technical and labor classes both of which grew in number throughout the period. This was fueled by a supportive and accommodating government, a supportive infrastructure, and a booming economy that was narrowly focused on tin. The two groups that suffered during the period were artisans and communal Indians.

For those who benefited, the change was, in an immediate sense, cost-free. The expansion of government and the development of a new transportation system were not supported by the wealth flowing into the country. Instead, they were financed by funds garnered from indemnifications for territory lost to Chile and Brazil. When these funds were exhausted, additional monies were borrowed abroad. Thus, in a time of economic boom, the foreign debt grew. While Bolivia was the epitome of financial soundness in the early 1900s, its debt grew as the Liberal period progressed.⁵

To Beginning

IV. Republican Rule: 1920 - 1935

By 1920, the growth and change that had occurred brought new strains to Bolivia and the elite structure began to fragment as it never had before. Toward the Liberal era, a minor internecine crack had already appeared in the Liberal power structure. In 1919, the Guerra administration unsuccessfully attempted to fine Patiño interests for a relatively minor indiscretion. Patiño, the primary sponsor of the Liberal Party, flexed his muscle and forced Guerra’s cabinet to resign.

This was a minor spat compared to what was to follow in the Republican period. After failing to win the 1920 election, the Republicans⁶ seized power through an uprising. However, signs of fragmentation began to appear among the Republican ranks even before victory was assured. Saavedra, the new Republican president, aligned himself with commercial, middle, and artisan classes. In response, a faction that supported the interests of the ruling oligarchy bolted and formed a third party, the Partido Republicano Genuino (The "Genuine Republican Party.") There was also growing dissatisfaction among mass groups. The first serious labor strike occurred in 1920 and Indians revolted in 1921. Both of these disturbances were quickly put down through the use of government troops.

These were only early indications of what was soon to follow. During the next fifteen years, the political, social, and economic fissures only hinted at by the events above, opened into mounting social and political disorder. Tin production reached its peak in 1929 and then began to decline. However, long before this, the industry became entangled in a cost/price squeeze. Production costs rose as poorer and poorer grades of ore were worked. Meanwhile, the price of tin yawed and pitched in the international market and sent shocks of boom and bust through the domestic economy. The problem that this created was exacerbated by Bolivia’s borrowing habits. In the early 1920s, Saavedra floated another 33 million dollar loan to consolidate the Bolivian national debt. Forty-five percent of Bolivian national income was now pledged to this loan. When tin prices collapsed at the onset of the Great Depression, it became impossible to meet debt payments. Bolivia became trapped in a debt squeeze. In 1931, it refused to make debt payments and became an "outlaw nation."

The above factors had a major impact on domestic society. The scarcity of communal lands and the uncertainties of the tin industry limited elite opportunity. The cost/price squeeze and the international loan crisis limited currency available to purchase foreign products. After a long period of growing affluence, the elite quality of life declined. These factors had similar effects on the fledgling working and middle classes. They could no longer count on continued security, opportunity, and advancement once the tin industry became unstable. The conditions for the working class, in particular, deteriorated. By the late 1930’s, Bolivia’s labor force was the lowest paid in the world. Thus, groups that had enjoyed the two-decade tin-boom, now joined the Indians and artisans, who had lost out in the earlier era.

Even though the Republicans managed to hang onto power until 1935, political stability began to erode long before this time. Although the major parties were still aligned with the existing elite, the elite itself became more fragmented and competitive. Because of growing fragmentation, the use of coalitions of growing numbers of factions became necessary to maintain political control. The factions themselves proved to be vacillating and mercurial. Thus, in the face of internecine bargaining and bickering, coalitions routinely broke down.

Saavedra, the first Republican President (1921-25), made an appearance of supporting labor, but was turned out of office after his troops fired on striking miners in 1923. Then, when his chosen successor attempted to quiet the resultant turmoil by proposing a united-front government, Saavedra overturned the election. This resulted in the election Hernando Siles (1925-30) who had been exiled by Saavedra in 1923. Siles aligned himself with students and formed a short-lived fourth party the Partido Nacionalista (The "Nationalist Party").

Like Saavedra, Siles accomplished little. Opposition from Liberals and the Genuine Republicans mounted against him after he took office. There was a brief period of cooperation after Paraguayan troops attacked a Bolivian outpost in the Chaco (the Southeastern region of Bolivia) in 1928. However, once the issue was resolved, cohesion again disintegrated. Siles ran for re-election as a single party candidate in 1929. Although he won a landslide victory, he was forced out of office by the opposition and a coalition of traditional parties (Liberal, Genuine Republicans, and Republicans) was installed. This coalition dissolved when the Genuine Republican President, Salamanca, packed the cabinet with his own cronies.

While the dominant faction in Bolivia squabbled, other indications of growing political turbulence were also evident. Although rare in the preceding Liberal era, labor disputes now became commonplace. Their frequency and intensity fluctuated with economic conditions tied directly to world tin prices, depressions, and other external economic forces. There was also unrest in the countryside. Close on the heels of an uprising in 1918, local peasant organizations and leadership started to form. Soon, there were organized efforts to resist hacienda expansion and to retake hacienda lands. Such efforts culminated in a massive uprising in 1927. Although occurring on a widespread basis, the disturbances were locally organized and easily suppressed.

Small non-traditional parties began to form and capitalize on popular unrest. Although they could be characterized as ideologically-based parties, one would be hard-pressed to place them into any particular ideological box. What they had in common was their lack of allegiance to the existing political structure and their advocacy of fundamental change. They assumed stances that reacted to various problems, tensions, and shortcomings that had begun to appear on the social landscape. These reactions exhibited several major themes. Nationalism was espoused in response to Bolivia’s entanglement with foreign loans as well as to the extra-national nature of its tin and petroleum-based economy.⁷ Socialism was espoused in response to the plight of labor. Land reform was advocated to resolve the problems of the rural population. During the period there was even a quickly quashed independence movement in Santa Cruz, a department in Bolivia’s tropical lowlands.

To Beginning

V. The Prelude to Revolution: 1935-1952

In spite of this growing malaise, one branch or the other of the Republican Party, hung on to power up to 1935 by using short-lived coalitions and frequent cabinet shuffles. Although its members struggled among themselves and had flirtations with such outsiders as labor and students, the existing order was not seriously threatened. However, another event occurred which traumatized Bolivia, brought the fifteen-year era of Republican rule to an end, and placed the hegemony of the existing elite under siege. This was the Chaco War (1932-35). The Chaco is a large, uninviting, and virtually uninhabited region on Bolivia’s southeastern periphery. It is also a region where there are large deposits of oil. In 1920, the newly installed Saavedra administration sold the rights to Chaco oil to Standard Oil of New Jersey and it was exporting oil to Argentina by 1925. The problem was that Paraguay contested Bolivia’s claim to the region. Bolivians, with a much larger and seemingly stronger country, did not take the Paraguayan threat seriously.

However, when Paraguayans persisted in their claim, tension mounted, sporadic military clashes began to occur, and finally, the Chaco War broke out in 1932. Bolivia’s overconfidence was quickly shattered. Unprepared and with long supply lines, it quickly gave ground. The line of battle moved back toward the Andean foothills. Finally, with its population centers much closer to the front, Bolivia mounted an offensive and reclaimed much of its lost territory. With both nations exhausted, a treaty was signed in 1935.⁸

Bolivia had little to show for its efforts. Although it had retained its oil fields, it had been bested by a much smaller nation. Furthermore, the war was a bloody affair resulting in the slaughter, wounding, and imprisonment of thousands of officers and soldiers. It had a devastating psychological effect on Bolivian society. Regular troops, mostly drawn from an indigenous population that only vaguely identified with Bolivia as a nation, were thrown into a horrible conflict from which they returned maimed and wounded. The large numbers of junior officers who had been captured or injured felt betrayed by the general military staff and national politicians. Peace did not ameliorate these feelings. Chaco war veterans returned to the urban centers to face a growing unemployment problem. Those who did find work joined one of the lowest paid labor forces in the world.

But the conduct of the Chaco War brought a larger issue to the fore. It questioned the validity of the existing social order. Once this questioning began, the central axis of Bolivian politics shifted. Up to this time, the supremacy of the existing oligarchy was never seriously challenged even though it engaged in much internecine squabbling. Now politics shifted toward a struggle between those defending the existing order and those who wanted fundamental change. This new cleavage ran deep through the Bolivian society cutting across the military as well as the civilian population. As time passed, the schism hardened and rigidified, and more extreme measures were taken by opposing sides to gain or maintain control.

It is not the case, however, that two consolidated and cohesive forces emerged on opposite sides of this cleavage. The traditional parties continued to struggle and fight among themselves even as they formed broad but ephemeral coalitions, sometimes including outsiders, in an effort to retain dominance. The non-traditional parties were no more successful than the traditional forces in presenting a solid political front. Numerous new parties sprang up and guarded their bits of ideological turf jealously, although it is difficult to characterize them ideologically. Challenges to the existing order came from both a right-wing element influenced by Italian, Spanish, and German fascism and a left wing, socialist orientation influenced by the Soviet Union. However, in Bolivia, these right and left ideologies tended to mix and merge.⁹ These numerous parties, competing with each other, took up the themes from the preceding period - nationalism, socialism, and land reform - in varying combinations. Although they took up the causes of labor or peasants, it was rare that they established strong grassroots organizations or formed associations with these groups. Instead, they remained small, elite cadre organizations with few contacts with the masses.

If politics were tumultuous during the Republican period, the effects of the Chaco War merely elevated the turbulence. Following the war, the level of political instability grew. The yawing and pitching of government became more extreme and new leadership began to surface. The radical, non-traditional political element became more prominent, began to attract a larger following, and began to gain tenuous and temporary holds on political power. The schism that had appeared was not limited to the civilian population. It was also evident in the military where a struggle emerged between status quo oriented high-ranking officers and radicalized line officers and ex-prisoners of war. The Post-Chaco War period also saw greater labor militancy, a growing number of labor disputes, and growing dissatisfaction among the middle class.

Thus, the general unity that was knitted together at the onset of the war, quickly dissolved as the war became a disaster. During the conflict, there were continuous disputes and challenges to Salamanca, the wartime president. Much of this dissent came from within the army. Finally, the military leadership, dissatisfied with Salamanca’s leadership, arrested him and assumed control. Following the war there were frequent changes in government accompanied by extreme changes in political philosophies.

The military government representing the interests of the existing elite was deposed in 1936 by the reform-oriented military regime of David Toro. In a subsequent coup, German Busch established a second reform-oriented regime in 1937. These regimes represent a significant departure from the past. Both Toro and Busch were from the junior officer’s corps. They had strong attachments to ex-prisoners of war and to radical groups. Toro nationalized Standard Oil holding in Bolivia. Busch held a constitutional convention in 1938 in which a broad spectrum of political actors participated. The resulting constitution broke with notions of limited government and inalienable individual rights. It stressed the responsibility of the state to assure the social and economic welfare of all Bolivians. It protected property only to the extent that it fulfilled a positive social function.

In an effort to defeat Busch, the Liberals, Genuine Republicans, and Republican Socialists¹⁰ formed an electoral alliance for the 1939 election. However, Busch threw out his own constitution and established a dictatorship. His rule came to a definitive end in August, 1939, when he committed suicide¹¹ and a conservative military government assumed control.

In the election of 1940, a hastily constructed alliance of traditional forces (the Concordia) won the presidency. However, this did not reestablish the conservative hegemony. Even though the electorate consisted of the small portion of the population that represented the more conservative elements of Bolivian society, radical opposition won over 17% of the presidential vote¹² and non-traditional forces won control of the Chamber of Deputies.

Although traditionalists held onto the presidency, their victory was short-lived. In the early 1940’s, strikes and agitation grew in intensity and frequency. In 1942, troops once again fired on striking miners and ended up killing hundreds of women and children. In the mid-term election of 1942, the traditional parties received only 14,000 votes to the 23,000 garnered by a collection of radicals. In 1943, the RADEPA (Razon de la Patria - roughly, "for Bolivia"), a secret organization of junior officers, overthrew the traditional regime and, in alliance with the radical Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, The "Nationalist Revolutionary Movement"), formed a government.¹³

Although the RADEPA was nationalist and pro-axis, Bolivia’s dependence on the sale of tin forced it to side with the US during World War II. Furthermore, to assure favorable treatment in the tin market, the RADEPA agreed to indemnify Standard Oil for the seizure of its interests. The MNR, of which much will be heard in the subsequent history of Bolivia, was soon forced out of government under pressure from the US and other Latin American nations. Without the popular support that the MNR provided, the RADEPA increasingly relied upon force to rule. It brought the MNR back into government in 1945.

In 1946, the Partido Izquierdista Revolucionario (PIR, Revolutionary Party of the Left) formed an electoral alliance with traditional parties to contest the mid-term election. Against this united front, the MNR won 60% of congressional seats. However, in July, a violent civilian revolt brought down the RADEPA government¹⁴ and a PIR/traditional party coalition assumed control. It ruled until 1952. During this period, the MNR successfully courted and gained support of middle class and labor.¹⁵ In the 1951 election, Victor Paz Estensoro, the exiled MNR candidate, received 54,000 votes against a total of 70,000 for five other parties. To prevent an MNR victory, the civilian president resigned and turned the governmental power over to the military. However, by 1952 support for the military regime evaporated. In April, after a revolt by labor and peasants, the MNR assumed power.

To Beginning

VI. Revolutionary Decline: 1952-1969

Outwardly, the 17 years following the 1952 Revolution were relatively stable and, for the most part, overtly democratic. Three civilian MNR administrations held office during the first twelve years of the period. The third of these fell to a military golpe de estato (literally "blow to the state." The Spanish equivalent to coup d’etat.) months before completing its term in 1964. However, René Barrientos, the MNR vice-president-elect, was one of the deposing generals. He ran for president in 1966 and was elected by an overwhelming majority. He remained in office until his death in a helicopter crash in 1969.¹⁶ His vice-president, Hernan Siles Salinas, then assumed office. The era came to an abrupt end when General Ovando Candia, another prominent member of the 1964 golpe de estato, ousted Siles S. from office and ushered in an era characterized by brute military dominance and rule.

The appearance of political continuity and relative calm during the 1952-69 period merely masks the underlying societal and political turmoil that was unleashed when the MNR was installed in office. Bolivian society underwent an abrupt, fundamental change. In the summer of 1952, suffrage was guaranteed to all adults without consideration of sex, the ability to read, or the ownership of property. Although a majority of the adult population had already become politically active in the period following the Chaco War, most were not permitted to participate in elections. Enfranchisement recognized the political importance that peasants and blue-collar workers had already achieved. 126,000 Bolivians voted in the 1951 election out of the 200,00 Bolivians who had the franchise. As of the summer of 1952, one million Bolivians became eligible to vote. By the 1960 election, 900,000 voted.

Following the enfranchisement in 1952, the mines were nationalized. An industry that had become increasingly dominated by foreign interests, and which in-turn, had dominated the Bolivian economy and politics, became 85% owned and operated by the government and the hegemony of the tin barons was destroyed. A system of co-gobierno (co-government) was implemented. This gave labor a significant role in the management of the mines. In 1953, agrarian reform was legalized and large land holdings were dismantled and given to their peasant occupants. In 1950, 72% of the Bolivians were engaged in agriculture but only 6% of all landowners held 92% of the land. By 1970, 30 million acres had been distributed to over 270,000 families. Eight years of education was made mandatory, and free secondary and post-secondary education was made available to all. Finally, the military, a group that had been actively involved both left and right wing politics, "was sent back to the barracks." Troop strength was reduced from 20,000 to 5,000 and those remaining were assigned to assist in civilian development projects.

As a result of 1952 Revolution, the MNR became the dominant political party in Bolivia, and it has remained important up to the present.¹⁷ Like many of the radical groups that emerged following the Chaco War, it consisted of a small elite group that presented itself as radical. In reality it had a vague ideology and maintained little contact with mass groups. By the time of the revolution, it had somewhat evolved. In contrast to the PIR,¹⁸ it had never compromised itself by participating in coalitions with the traditional parties. Instead, it positioned itself as the consistent radical opposition to a power structure that was crumbling. Because of this, it inherited support from the ranks growing weary of traditional rule.

At the time of the 1952 Revolution, the MNR still consisted of a small national organization without a significant grassroots presence. It did have a working relationship with labor. In fact, one of its four leaders, Juan Lechin Oquendo, was a central figure in Bolivia’s radical labor movement. However, as a party leader, Juan Lechin joined an unlikely group. The three other leaders were intellectuals rather than activists and had little contact with the masses. Politically, the leader of the party, Victor Paz, was a progressive reformer (at this time). The other two, Hernan Siles Zuazo and Walter Guevara Arce, were conservative nationalists.

The point is that the leadership of the party covered the non-traditional waterfront. Even though the MNR promised universal suffrage, agrarian reform, and the nationalization of the tin mines during the 1951 election, its real intentions were, if not undefined, at least vague.¹⁹ Upon the assumption of power, it appeared to mimic the actions of the Liberal Party of 1899 (which made many promises but delivered on few of them once in power.) The MNR actively pursued only universal suffrage.

However, this time, conditions were different. Contrary to the usual practice, the military had not participated in the revolution; it was labor and worker’s militias that installed the MNR in power.²⁰ This not only broke the power of the military but made the MNR completely dependent on labor for support. From their position of strength, labor militias literally seized control of the mines and instituted the above-mentioned "co-gobierno." The creation of the Compania Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL, The state enterprise that managed the nationalized mines), which legitimated these actions, was created after the mines had already been, in effect, nationalized.

Soon, peasants followed labor’s lead. This is not to suggest that an effective national peasant organization spontaneously emerged. However, local peasant organizations quickly formed militias. In the fall of 1952, in the wake of labor’s actions in the mines, rural disturbances began to occur, spread, and grew in intensity. Land was violently appropriated. Indigenous rebellion is not unusual in Andean Latin America. However, it is usually put down by military force. In this case, the possibility of military reaction had been nullified. As with the nationalization of the mines, peasant appropriations were legitimated by the MNR government after the fact.

In other words, the MNR’s first administration, that of the progressive Victor Paz (1952-56) did not drive the revolution, in fact, it had virtually no control over what was happening. It merely reacted as autonomous forces created fundamental change. However, a serious problem now faced Bolivia and the MNR. Through co-gobierno, the government had lost control of the mines, the dominant force in the economy, the major source of the county’s foreign exchange, and the government’s primary source of revenue. There was already a squeeze on profits due to falling prices in the Post-World-War II era coupled with a steady decline in the quality of ore deposits. Exploding employment rolls and growing wages resulting from labor participation in the management (co-gobierno) exacerbated these problems. Somewhat less problematic, agricultural production declined as cash-crop-oriented hacienda lands were converted to subsistence plots. And, with the military in disarray, there were nothing to counterbalance the strength of labor and peasant militias. Throughout the early 1950s inflation soared and local labor and peasant militias ruled Bolivia.

In order to assume control, the MNR reversed its direction. With reticence on the part of both countries, an accord was reached between the USA and Bolivia. The US recognized the MNR government and offered economic and military assistance. In exchange, Bolivia gave Gulf Oil the right to exploit oil in the Chaco and promised to implement an austerity program.²¹ This was all well and good. However, the Bolivian government was incapable of implementing such a program. Thus the years following Paz’s first administration were spent attempting to corral the societal forces that had been unleashed in 1952.

With assistance from the US, there was an effort to rebuild the army. It grew from 5,000 troops in 1955 to 12,000 in 1964. The US provided equipment and training and it once again became more than a match for militias. Meanwhile, the MNR’s base of support shifted. The two major forces behind the revolution, peasants and labor, had interests that were essentially antithetical. Following 1952 Revolution, labor continued to press for radical change. Once peasants had achieved their goal, possession of land, they wanted the change to stop. To the extent they could be organized, they were a conservative force. Increasingly the MNR used these differences as a wedge and used peasant militias to check labor’s influence.

This movement to the right is evident in the policies of successive MNR administrations. Early in Paz’s first administration, popular forces and not the regime controlled change in Bolivia. By the end of his regime, the administration was sidling up to the US for support. During the 1956-60 Siles. administration, the resurrection of the military was well under way, and US aid dollars began to bolster the Bolivian economy. Siles. took on the task of implementing the austerity program and ending co-gobierno. When miners reacted, peasant militias were used to suppress them.

The second Paz regime (1960-64) was more moderate than the first, and by its end, the military was its sole source of support. Fittingly, Rene Barrientos, the commanding officer of Bolivia’s air force, was Paz’s vice-presidential running- mate in the 1964 election. The coup in 1964, with Barrientos was a principal author, was no discontinuity in the MNR transition. It was a reaction to the growing fragmentation of the MNR and to the Paz 1964 candidacy.²² In effect, it was an effort on the part of various MNR factions within the military to preserve the revolution. The transition to conservative policies was completed by Barrientos during his 1966-69 administration. He relied on military support, but was a populist president who had strong ties with peasant. In addition, he was closely allied with the US.²³ By 1968, US aid to Bolivia was the highest in the world on a per capita basis.²⁴

However, as has been stated, there was a spectrum of ideologies represented by the leadership in 1952. The swing in the orientation of the MNR administrations during the period did not mean that its leadership had changed positions. The MNR fragmented as such the swing occurred. The fragmentation was well under way by the end of the Siles administration. In 1957, the MNR split into two factions, the Acción de Defensa del MNR ("Action in the defense of the MNR"), conservative and the Izquierda Nacional del MNR ("National left-wing of the MNR"), in the hands of radical labor. In 1958, Lechin organized the Sector Izquierda del MNR ("Left-wing section of the MNR"). When Paz ran for president in 1960 instead of Guevara, there was further fragmentation. Guevara organized the conservative MNR Autentico (The "Authentic MNR" which was to become the Partido Revolucionario Autentico (PRA)).²⁵ In 1964, the Sector Pazestensorista (The "Paz Estensoro Sector") emerged which was nothing more than a faction that lobbied for Paz’s third term. When Paz ran in 1964 instead of Lechin, like Guevara, Lechin organized his own party, the Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacionalista (PRIN, the "Left Nationalist Revolutionary Party").

To Beginning

VII. Military Mayhem: 1969-1982

One of the results of the 1952 revolution was that labor and the peasant had become powerful political forces in Bolivia. They had taken their place beside traditional forces, which regained strength as the 1952-69 period progressed.²⁶ However, the MNR failed in its effort to harness these forces and direct them. Instead, it was a multi-headed political hydra which fragmented when confronted by societal divisions rather than reconciling and transforming them. One of the outstanding features of the three MNR civilian administrations was that they made the alienation of blocs of support a major industry. These groups, diverse and divided, did not unite into a cohesive opposition. Instead, they formed a multitude of parties. Thus, the 1964 Junta was illogical in claiming that it assumed control of government to preserve the revolution. However, nothing of a fundamental nature changed following the coup; Bolivian society remained fractured. An increasing reliance on the rule of force was used to address this.

By 1968, Barrientos had given up on liberal processes and began to rule dictatorially. In 1969, after his successor, Siles S. (not to be confused with Siles Zuazo, one of the leaders of the 1952 Revolution.)was deposed, the government turned overtly military. However, the new military was no more cohesive than the MNR. Correspondingly, it was no more successful at straddling the cleavages of Bolivian society than the civilian MNR before it. The thirteen-year period between 1969 and 1982 consisted of 12 different administrations; only two were civilian. Given that General Hugo Banzer was in office for seven of the thirteen years (1971-78), regimes came and went at a pace that was rapid even by Bolivian standards. Excluding Banzer’s stay, regimes between 1969 and 1982 lasted, on the average, slightly over six months each.

The major participants in the 1964 golpe de estato were no less diverse than was the MNR when it came to power in 1952. Barrientos, the first member of the junta to hold power, was a conservative populist, was supported by the peasants and the military, and had strong ties with the USA. Even though Barrientos was a charismatic leader, his right-leaning orientation made many enemies. The rapid spurt of economic growth that occurred in the 1960s was achieved through loans, growing debt, massive layoffs, and labor repression. This angered a broad range of economic actors. In 1969, Barrientos died in a helicopter accident and his vice-president, Siles Salines (Siles S.), assumed the presidency. Shortly after Siles S. took office business and labor held a national strike. The following day, General Ovando Candia, a second member of the 1964 golpe, overturned the civilian government.

Unlike Barrientos, Ovando²⁷ was an anti-US nationalist who strongly supported labor. He attempted to create a "revolution from above" in the fashion of the progressive General Juan Velasco who assumed power in Peru in 1968.²⁸ Ovando loaded his cabinet with civilian and military radicals, rejuvenated unions, re-employed miners, raised wages, and nationalized Gulf Oil.29 However, unlike Barrientos who had the support of peasants, Ovando had no strong connections with labor. Without a popular base of support, he was forced to resign in 1970. Following a brief, unsuccessful grab for power by a conservative military group, he was succeeded by General Juan José Torres, a third participant in the 1964 coup. Torres was a socialist who was swept into power with radical support. During his ten months in office he attempted to reform agriculture, create greater labor autonomy, and establish a foreign policy independent of the US. A popular assembly was created and stacked with radical elements - Juan Lechin served as its president. The assembly ousted the US Peace Corps, resurrected workers’ militias, supported worker and peasant seizures of private mines and agribusiness.

Thus, during the two years following Rene Barrientos’ death, there was a shift to the left. However, in 1971, General Hugo Banzer, a fourth member of the 1964 golpe de estato, overthrew Torres. His regime marked a shift back to the right. Banzer modeled his regime after the military government that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1982.³⁰ He was interested in economic development and had a pragmatic approach in encouraging it. He made no pretense of having a base of popular support. He repressed labor, peasants, and students and banned leftist parties outright while favoring mining, business, petroleum, and agribusiness.³¹ Finally, he re-established strong ties with the US.

Banzer’s regime was tolerated because there was prosperity; Bolivia was an exporter of petroleum and benefited from the oil crises that occurred during the decade. However, he incurred considerable costs. His repression of peasants alienated them. Up to this time, peasant unions had maintained a strong relationship with the military and the MNR. As a result of his actions, they developed an independent base of power. In 1978, a new, national peasant union, the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Camposinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB - the "Only Confederation of Peasant Unions of Bolivia) was organized.³² Furthermore, Banzer’s administration pushed peasants back into alliance with their old revolutionary partner, labor. The CSUTCB joined the Confederacion Obrera Boliviana (COB) - peasants and miners began to work together once again.³³

One of the reasons Banzer’s regime lasted as long as it did was that he violated many of his conservative principles. He was buoyed-up by US aid and borrowing during his seven years in office. Bolivia’s foreign debt rose from 782 million dollars in 1971 to 3.1 billion in 1978. Adding to this conservative heresies, he created government jobs to ease labor dissatisfaction and to buy elite support. Government employment grew at 9.7% a year during his stay. In spite of this, opposition to his repressive regime continued to grow until, in 1978, he was forced to hold elections.

The four years following Banzer’s departure consist of a frenetic blur of golpes de estato intermixed with interim civilian governments. Elections were held in 1978. The results were invalidated because of fraud, but the winner, Pereda, seized power.³⁴ He was deposed by the military in the same year. Elections were again held in 1979, with Siles Z. narrowly beat Victor Paz (Banzer came in a distant third).³⁵ However, Congress was deadlocked on the choice of a president and Walter Guevara, now leading the Partido Revolutionario Autentico (PRA), was selected for a one-year interim presidency (note: three of the four MNR leaders of the 1952 Revolution were involved in the 1979 election.)

Guevara’s interim presidency fell to a golpe de estato by Colonel Natusch Busch (descendent of German Busch, the suicidal, radical dictator of the 1930s.) After only two weeks, Busch’s regime collapsed and the leader of the Chamber of Deputies, Lydia Gueiles Tejada, was made interim president. In the 1980 election, Siles Z. won a plurality with 39% of the vote.³⁶ However, to add to what was already a complex mix of powerful political forces, by the late 1970s, coca had become a major export of Bolivia.³⁷ Afraid that Siles would investigate drug trafficking, General Garcia Meza, and other officers involved in the cocaine trade, seized power. The Meza regime was a pariah both domestically and internationally. The international community refused to recognize his government and cut off foreign aid and loans. Meza used extreme violence to maintain power.³⁸ He was removed by another military regime after holding power one year. However, by this time there was little tolerance for military regimes of any ilk. In the face of nationwide demonstrations, power was handed over to Congress. It validated the 1980 election and put Hernan Siles in office.

To Beginning

VIII. The Period of Stability: 1982 - Present

When Siles assumed the presidency as a pro-labor liberal in 1982, the civil society was united against a military that had completely discredited itself, but it remained highly fragmented. There were numerous parties (for example, in the 1985 election, 66 parties and five "multiparties" registered candidates for offices being contested.) Siles’s own base of support was shaky, it consisted of a collection of angry and independent minded labor, peasant, and student groups that had developed autonomous leadership in the face of the unfavorable treatment they’d received since 1972. Thus, even with the re-establishment of co-gobierno and with a pro-labor candidate in office, labor disturbances became an everyday occurrence. There were over 200 strikes during Siles’ first three months in office. The opposition controlled the National Assembly. There were splits in Siles’ own party - even his vice-president, Jaime Paz Zamora, opposed him (Jaime Paz is Victor Paz’s nephew.) Siles went through six cabinets and 75 ministers by the time he left office in 1985.

The economy was undergoing another major transition. Even though the tin industry continued to weaken, it still played an important role in the export economy. It was also the country’s major employer. However, natural gas began to challenge tin in importance. Coca became a highly valuable export as cocaine became the drug of choice in industrial societies in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, a hidden, illegal economy began to grow in importance and take its place beside a feeble legitimate one. As this economy grew, it not only created strong, invisible new interests within the country, it also placed Bolivia more in the spotlight internationally, particularly after Meza seized power.

However, the economy was not only undergoing a transition, it was in shambles. The country had received unfavorable treatment by international and foreign financial institutions since the time of Meza. The parade of military regimes had accumulated a 4.9 billion dollar foreign debt. This represented 32% of its export potential. They had also left behind a bloated government payroll. Falling oil prices put Bolivia in a debt squeeze. The GNP was falling precipitously and had already declined to 1969 levels. Inflation was high. Tin cost 20% more to produce than its price on the international market. The fact that labor, now a co-manager of tin, was one of the president’s bastions of support made this problem particularly difficult to deal with. Finally, during his term, there were both droughts and floods - approximately one-third of the population faced starvation.

In spite of this impressive list of problems, Siles’s 1982-85 stay in office is probably most noted for hyperinflation. It was important to stabilize the crisis-ridden economy but it was not obvious how to do it. Siles’s used a two-prong approach. First, he devalued the currency. However, devaluing currency, in effect, reducing wages which would displease labor, his major base of support. Thus, to satisfy labor, he concurrently raised wages. Combined, these actions merely fueled the problem that they were meant to quell. The devaluations were never quite in step with the inflation rate, and when coupled with the increase in wages, functioned as an inflation engine. Soon the Bolivian economy was involved in a hyperinflationary cycle that reached an astonishing 60,000% annualized increase at its height.³⁹

Surprisingly, the Siles administration ushered in a new political era in Bolivia, one that has been uncharacteristically stable. Siles called early elections and left office in 1985. Since his departure, four administrations have been elected and taken office. The first three completed their terms and peacefully handed over the reins of power to duly selected successors who were of a different party. Even though many parties still exist, three parties (Banzer’s ADN, Victor Paz’s MNRH, and Jaime Paz’s MIR⁴⁰) now dominate. Although no party has received a majority of the vote, durable ruling coalitions have been created that have the ability to implement policies that would have been impossible to put in place in the past. Finally, in spite of party turn-over, there has been a remarkable continuity in policies - policies that have ushered in an era of economic stability.

Of the 18 contenders who ran for the presidency in 1985, only two were serious candidates - Victor Paz and Hugo Banzer. Banzer beat Paz by capturing 29% (to 26%) of the votes, but Congress selected Paz as president. However, Paz turned around and formed a governing alliance (the Pacto por la Democratica (PD)) with Banzer in order to capture majority support in Congress. In consultation with business, the IMF, and other international agencies, Paz then implemented an austerity program that devalued the Peso Boliviano (PB), increased prices, froze wages, eliminated 20,000 jobs, emphasized the market economy, opened Bolivia to international trade, and raised taxes. In essence, Paz implemented a severe version of Banzer’s plan.⁴¹

Surprisingly, Bolivia defied the conventional wisdom suggesting that democratically elected administrations cannot survive austerity programs. The plan was implemented in late August, 1985. The hyperinflation abruptly ended one week later. The program implemented displeased labor, and labor displeasure brought down regimes in the past. When labor protested, Paz declared a state of siege and exiled its leadership. The inflation-weary population generally supported these actions. Ironically, Juan Lechin, Paz’s old comrade from the 1950s was among the labor exiles. The economy and the political situation remained stable throughout the remainder of Paz’s regime even after his coalition began to disintegrate.

Because the austerity program received strong political support, all three major parties promised to continue the program during the election of 1989 election. Although, the MNRH’s Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, the archetect of Paz’s program, won a narrow victory in the popular vote, congress selected Jaime Paz of the MIR as president.⁴² Jaime Paz formed a coalition with Banzer called the Acuerdo Patriotico (AP.) This is an interesting alliance. Jaime Paz.had been exiled by Banzer during his dictatorship. Essentially, the AP was as stable as its predecessor and gave the administration adequate congressional support. In 1993, Losada and the MNRH won the election and established a single party government. Banzer won the presidency in 1997.

Since the austerity program was first implemented, the Bolivian economy has completed its transition away from dependence on tin – natural gas was clearly Bolivia’s major legal export.⁴³ The government has privatized unprofitable mines. However, this has also had unanticipated, negative side effects. With the rapid decline of tin in the 1980s, unemployed miners have moved to the lowlands and turned to coca production. Estimates suggest that coca accounted for 15% of Bolivia’s GDP and 700 million dollars a year in exports in the early 1990s. This both strengthened the various domestic interests associated with the drug industry and alarmed the US and the international community.

Thus, the cocaine industry has been both a potent, enticing economic asset and a political liability to Bolivia. Due to the strong pressure from the US and international institutions, the country has been forced to face this dilemma squarely. With the assistance of the US and the UN, the country has attempted to limit and eradicate coca production. However, such efforts have caused serious political unrest, clashes between the military and peasant groups, and spurred a new wave of peasant militancy.

Although the austerity program continues to receive support, it has been the source of unrest as well. The economy has not responded with sound economic growth. Thus, labor, peasants, and the poor - the groups that have had to bear the brunt of austerity’s ill effects - remain in poverty and can see no end in sight. There is growing impatience among these groups and backsliding into old ways of doing business. Victor Paz’s coalition (The PD) broke down because he refused to create jobs. His successor, Jaime Paz, acquiesced to the demands of labor and other groups by creating 20,000 new jobs, the exact number that his uncle (Victor Paz) eliminated.

However, there have been creative experiments and efforts to find new and effective solutions to the problems created by austerity and cocaine. Although the IMF has demanded that that Bolivia privatize nationalized industries, many Bolivians feel that privatization is a theft of public property.⁴⁴  Sensitive to these sentiments, Losada implemented "capitalization," a program in which 50% of the ownership of state-owned enterprises is distributed to all citizens over 21 and the remainder sold to foreign companies. With the support of the US and international institutions, the country has attempted to develop resources and alternative crops in order to build a strong, legal, economic infrastructure to replace the production of coca. Given the profitability of coca production, such efforts have met with limited success.

Ultimately, a socio-economic race exists in Bolivia – will the country achieve an adequate level of economic success before the population and the politicians lose their patience and turn once again to their old turbulent ways?

To Beginning

Endnotes

1.    Bolivia’s constitution has changed often. Its legislature has been bicameral, unicameral, and tricameral. Presidential terms have ranged from eight to four years. The number of vice-presidents has varied from zero to two. The President’s state of siege powers have also changed often.

2.     The rail system started in the 1880s was not a national system. It was a Potosi - Coastal system designed to haul silver and consumer goods between the coast and the silver mining region around Potosi.

3.     This sale is another example of Bolivia’s inability to exploit major resources existing in its peripheral regions. The country ceded much of its Amazonian region to Brazilians who successfully exploited the area during the rubber boom.

4.    Bolivia has two capitals even today. The Supreme Court remains in Sucre while other branches of government are in La Paz.

5.    Liberal regimes did not have to pay a political price for their borrowing. It was not until the Republicans were in office that serious consequences to this practice emerged.

6.     The Republican Party replaced the Conservatives shortly after the 1898 Revolution.

7.     Oil production became an important industry in Bolivia in the 1920’s.

8.     Including losses of territory to Chile, Paraguay, and Brazil, Bolivia lost approximately one-half of its territory. In just sixty-five years, Bolivia had been reduced from a nation the size of Mexico to one slightly larger than the combined territories of France, Spain, and Portugal.

9.    Thus, the terms "traditional" and "non-traditional" are used here instead of left, right, conservative. The term traditional includes individuals and groups that support the existing order. Those who seek to topple that order are characterized as non-traditional. The terms "moderate" and "radical" are not meant to express any particular ideology. Instead, they express the degree and rate at which change is desired.

10.   By this time, the Republican Party, representing the traditional power structure, had changed its name to the "Republican Socialist Party" in an effort to capture left support .

11.   The specific reason for Busch’s committed suicide is unknown.

12.   Only 58,000 votes were cast in 1940, with Jose Antonio Arze of the Frente Izquierda Boliviano (FIB, Bolivian Left Front) receiving over 10,000 votes.

13.   The MNR is to play an important role in the subsequent history of Bolivia. It has general been characterized as left wing and radical. It is difficult to characterize it as such. Although, it aligned itself with "leftist" groups during this period, it was pro-Nazi Germany at the onset of WWII, advocated economic nationalism, was silent on land reform, and showed little interest in the labor movement.

14.   In one of Bolivia’s more colorful moments, Villarroel, the RADEPA president, was hung from a lamppost in front of the government palace.

15.   The MNR’s success can be partly attributed to the fact that the other major radical party, the PIR, had fatally compromised itself forming a governing coalition with traditional parties.

16.   Barrientos’s majority election is unusual in Bolivia. Because so there are so many parties and contestants, few candidates receive a majority. Thus, most often, the legislature selects the president.

17.   There are numerous MNR splinters - e.g. the "Authentic MNR," the "Left MNR," the "Historic MNR," etc.

18.   Not to be confused with the Mexican PRI, the PIR is a Bolivian left wing party that formed a coalition government with traditional parties in the late 1940s.

19.   In fact, a stated purpose of the 1951 coup preventing the MNR from taking power was to stop the fascist/communist threat.

20.   Since the 1920s the military had become increasingly involved in government and changes in power. By the mid-1930s, it was usually military personnel associated with a particular political group that seized power and installed civilians in key cabinet posts. However, the MNR was isolated from other elite forces in society and relied upon mass support. When the revolution occurred, the military stood by the sidelines. Initially, the lack of military involvement confused the MNR. It had assumed that a faction supportive of it would assume power and ask it to participate in government.

21.   It promised to freeze wages and benefits and stimulate free market growth.

22.   One of the devices used by the Mexican PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) to maintain power was to shun continuismo, the practice of the executive succeeding himself. The idea was to maintain a united front by allowing all major players to have a turn in office. The MNR attempted to employ this mechanism. However, it was violated in 1960 when Victor Paz insisted on a second term after only one of his co-leaders had occupied the presidency. His desire to run again in 1964 created major disruption within the MNR.

23.   Symbolic of the culmination from the radical-to-conservative transition, Barrientos made frequent visits to the campo. During such visits he would step out of his US-made, military helicopter wearing his ten-gallon hat and cowboy boots - gifts from Lyndon Johnson.

24.   One of the reasons for the strong US support was that it feared that Bolivia would end up in the socialist bloc. This threat first emerged following the 1952 Revolution and was one strong inducement that eventually resulted in US support for the unpopular (in the US) MNR regime. By the time the MNR threat appeared to be contained in the late 1960s, Ché Guevara had arrived in Bolivia and was leading a small guerrilla band in the Chaco. He was captured and killed in 1967.

25.   Upon assuming power in 1952, there was an agreement that its four leaders would all be president in the following order: Victor Paz., Siles., Guevara., and Lechin. In 1960 and 64, Paz reneged on this agreement by running for office, thus violating the prohibition against "continuoismo."

26.   One big difference was that the power of the tin barons was permanently destroyed. Although the position of business interests strengthened, it was no longer constrained by this small, powerful group.

27.   By tacit agreement, Ovando was supposed to have a turn at president following Barrientos.

28.   Velasco was a progressive populist who nationalized fisheries, petroleum, banking, and utilities. He also implemented agrarian and industrial reform giving labor and the peasants a greater stake in the economy. Velasco was also a nationalist who wanted greater independence from the US. He recognized the USSR in 1971 and threw out the Peace Corps in 1974.

29.   The nationalization caused a rift with the USA, which cut off all aid until Ovando agreed to compensate Gulf Oil 78 million dollars.

30.   The 1964-84 military government in Brazil attempted to overcome the country’s political factions by standing above them. Although it held regular elections, it maintained strict control over the electoral process to the extent that it created pro and anti-regime parties. Furthermore, it did not allow elections to intrude on policy. It was growth and development oriented and was conservative in approach other than that it actively participated in the economy. During its rule, inflation was low, and there was a high rate of growth. It voluntarily released the reins of government in 1984.

31.   Banzer had a "self-coup" in 1974. Self-coups occur when power-holders are dissatisfied with the institutional arrangements of their regimes. Initially after Banzer seized government, political and governmental institutions continued to exist officially. After his self-coup, all parties were banned and Banzer’s rule became overtly dictatorial.

32.   By 1978, the CSUTCB boasted 3 million members or over 50% of Bolivia’s population. Its leader, Genaro Flores Santos, spent most of the 1970s in exile because of his union activities.

33.   The CSUTCB joined the Conferacion Obrera Boliviano (COB - Bolivian Worker’s Confederation) and Genaro Flores became one of its leaders.

34.   Pereda received 987,140 out of the 1,971,968 votes cast. Siles received 484,383 and Victor Paz 213,622.

35.   Siles received 528,696 votes, Victor Paz 527,184, and Banzer, 218,587 out of over 1,600,000 votes cast. Siles was now left-leaning and led the Unidad Democratica Popular (UDP), Victor Paz was a moderate and led the MNRH (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Historico), and Banzer remained conservative and was at the head of the Acción Democratica Nacional (ADN).

36.   Jaime Paz received 21% and Banzer 17% in this election.

37.   Coca is a traditional crop in the Andean highlands where it has been grown for indigenous use since pre-Colombian times.

38.   For example, government assassins murdered Marcelo Quiroga, leader of the Partido Socialista Unico (The "Only Socialist Party") and attempted to murder Genaro Floris, leader of the new, independent national peasants’ union. They also exiled Juan Lechin and other labor leaders.

39.   On November 6, 1982, Siles devaluated the Peso Boliviano (PB) from 44.5 to 200 to the dollar and raised the minimum wage from 5,990 to 8,490 PB per month. The inflation rate reached 40%. On November 17, 1983 he devaluated the PB from 200 to 500 to the dollar, and inflation crept to 300%. By July, 1985, the PB had reached 2 million to the dollar, and the inflation rate had reached an astonishing 60,000% on an annualized basis. Bolivia was the first country to experience a hyperinflation not associated with war or its aftermath.

40.   Jaime Paz’s party is the Movimiento Izquierda Revolutionario (MIR - Revolutionary Movement of the Left.)

41.   Note: Paz was a progressive reformer during his 1952-56 presidency and a moderate in 60-64. Banzer was the dictator that maintained his position through foreign borrowing and distributing government jobs. Now both were strong, economic liberals (i.e. conservatives.)

42.   The vote was Losada 23%, Banzer 22.6%, and Jaime Paz 19.6%.

43.   In 1988, the sale of tin represented approximately 13% of Bolivia’s exports, the sale of natural gas, 36%.

44.   Such an assumption is not unfounded; in 1992 there were charges of corruption associated with the sale of public enterprises.

To Beginning

Readings

Alexander, Robert J. 1982. Bolivia: Past, Present, and the Future of its Politics. New York: Praeger

Bailey, Jennifer L., and Torbjørn L. Knutsen. 1987. "Surgery Without Aneaesthesia: Bolivia’s Response to Economic Chaos." World Today. 43:47-51

Cagan, Philip. 1956. "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation." In Studies in the Quantitative Theory of Money. Ed: Milton Friedman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cavarozzi, Marcelo. 1992. "Beyond Transition to Democracy in Latin America." Journal of Latin American Studies. 24:665-84.

Chalmers, Douglas A. 1969. "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics." In Linkage Politics; Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. Ed: James N. Rosenau. New York: Free Press. pp 67-93.

________________. 1972. "Demystification of Development." In Changing Latin America. Ed: Douglas A. Chalmers. New York: The Academy of Political Science. pp 109-22.

Cockcroft, James D., Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson. 1972. Dependence and Underdevelopment in Latin America’s Political Economy. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books.

Cole, Julio Harold. 1987. Latin American Inflation. New York: Praeger.

The Economist:

July 7, 1984: 36. "No Way Out."

May 4, 1985: 39, 42. "Who Wants to be a Millionaire?"

May 28, 1988: 74-75. "Doing it by the Book."

July 1, 1989: 56. "When a Winner Cries Foul."

August 12, 1989: 33. "How the Last Became First."

September 23, 1989: Survey: 16, 20, 22, 24. "A Platform of Growth."

May 23, 1991: 48. "Its all Money."

August 10, 1991: 40. "The Forgotten."

April 25, 1992: 48,49. "The Slippery Slope."

August 29, 1992: 36, 40. "Doped."

October 31, 1992: 43,44. "Cleaning Up."

May 8, 1993: 52. "Under the Eye of the Police."

September 11, 1993: 46. "Spreading the Rewards of Virtue."

 

Frank, Andre Gunder. 1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Furtado, Celso. 1970. Economic Development of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gamarra, Eduardo A. 1994. "Crafting Political Support for Stabilization: Political Pacts and the New Economic Policy in Bolivia." In Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America. Ed: William C. Smith, Carlos H Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp 105-27.

Hobson, J.A. 1965. Imperialism: A Study. Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan Press.

Houry, Eimad. 1991. External Shocks, Economic Adjustment and Political Democratization in Developing Countries During the 1980s. Dissertation: Florida State University.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

__________________. 1991 The Third Wave. Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press.

IMF. 1979. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.:The International Monetary Fund.

___. 1990. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington, D.C.:The International Monetary Fund.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1966. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.

Kaufman, Robert R. 1977. "Corporatism, Clientelism, and Partisan Conflict: A Study of Seven Latin American Countries." In Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. Ed: James M. Malloy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp 109-48.

Klein, Herbert S. 1969. Parties and Political Change in Bolivia: 1880-1952. London: Cambridge University Press.

Langer, Erick D. 1989. Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia: 1880-1930. Stanford: Stanford U. Press.

Linz, Juan J.. 1978. "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration." In The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Ed: Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Part I: 3-99..

Malloy, James M. 1970. Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press.

Malloy, James M., and Eduardo Gamarra. 1988. Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transacion Books.

Morales, Juan Antonio. 1988. "Inflation Stabilization in Bolivia." In Inflation Stabilization. Ed: Bruno, Tella, Dornbusch, & Fischer. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

__________________. 1994. "Democracy, Economic Liberalism, and Structural Reform in Bolivia." In Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America. Ed: William C. Smith, Carlos H Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp 129-148.

Morales, Watraud Quiser. 1992. Bolivia: Land of Struggle. Boulder: Westview Press.

O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Berkeley: University of California, Institute for International Studies.

O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Paige, J. 1975. Agrarian Revolution. New York: Free Press.

Peaslee, Amos J. 1970. Constitutions of the World, Volume IV - The Americas. The Hague, Nehterlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Remmer, Karen L. 1992-3. "The Process of Democratization in Latin America." Studies in Comparative International Development. 27:4:3-24.

Saba, Raul P. 1987. Political Development and Democracy in Peru: Continuity, Change, and Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 1987. "The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization." American Economic Review. 27:279-83.

Whitehead, Laurence. 1986. "Bolivia’s Failed Democratization, 1977-1980." In Transition from Authoritarian Rule; Part II: Latin America. Ed: Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 49-71.

Wilkie, James W. 1969. The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952. Los Angeles: The Latin American Center, UCLA.

Wynia, Gary W. 1990. The Politics of Latin American Development, 3rd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yanghong, Guan. 1985. "Upheaval Haunts Coming Elections." Beijing Review. April 1:13-4.

Zondag, Cornelius H. 1966. The Bolivian Economy: 1952-65. New York, Praeger.