| Situations: July 24 - Aug. 19 - Sept. 17 - Nov. 23 |
The Situation:
The Mines
August 18, 2001
One cannot really understand Bolivia without understanding its mines. It was the silver of the "Cerro Rico"…(rich hill) that first attracted the Spaniards to this inaccessible, roughed part of South America. It had such an attraction that by the late 17th century the city of Potosi, founded on the flanks of the Cerro Rico, had grown to a population of 200,000. It was the largest city in Latin America and one of the largest cities in the world. However, at the time of Bolivia’s independence (1826) the silver industry was in shambles, the economy of the newborn country languished, and Potosi had practically disappeared – its population was a mere 10,000.
There was a brief revival of the silver industry in the late 1800s, but by the turn of century the industry was once again in decline. However, tin was growing importance due to western industrialization. Bolivia soon became the world’s major producer of the metal. The tin boom brought many changes. The old silver aristocracy exhausted itself in an effort to bolster an industry that was dying due to forces beyond Bolivia’s control. A new tin aristocracy took its place. Simón Patiño, a campesino, was the leader of this group. He controlled 50% of Bolivia’s tin and was said to be the richest man in the world. Because it took a lot of capital to produce tin, this aristocracy was much more tied to international banking and finance than the earlier silver barons. During the boom, Bolivia gained a second capitol when the executive and legislative branches of government moved from Sucre to La Paz, a city much more accessible to the outside world. A modern railway network was built to get tin to the ocean and on to international markets. A managerial/technical class grew up to deal with complicated process involved in producing tin. Finally, nestled in mining camps scattered across the Bolivian landscape, a landscape that was agrarian and feudal, a large industrial, working class came into being.
Unfortunately, Bolivia’s tin boom did not last. Foreign competitors emerged. There was a tin glut and its price plummeted on the international market. At the same time, the quality of Bolivian ore was in decline – tin cost more and more to produce. By the late 1920s, Bolivia was bankrupt and had defaulted on its international loans. There was high unemployment - managers, technicians, and workers alike saw their prospects erode. Dissatisfaction reached even greater heights with Bolivia’s humiliating defeat in the Chaco War, a bloody and mismanaged struggle again tiny Paraguay.
Finally, in 1952, things reached a breaking point. Victor Paz Estensoro, the leader of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR – National Revolutionary Movement,) was elected president. Interestingly, neither the workers nor the peasants had the right to vote; an electorate composed of the middle and upper classes put the MNR in office. When the ruling powers refused to allow the newly elected president take office, there was a violent uprising. The hastily-established, military government was overthrown. Although the MNR had promised to nationalize the mines it is doubtful that it would have kept its promise. However, the miners did not wait around to find out; they seized the mines. With little choice, the government then nationalized the mines. (The very same thing happened with regard to campesinos. The MNR promised land reform – campesinos violently seized the land – land reform legislation was then enacted.)
Miners had become a powerful political force in Bolivia. Juan Lechin O., the leader of the miner’s union was one of the four leaders of the MNR. He was slated to have his turn as president. A system of "co-gobierno" was established; miners actually sat on the governing board of Comibol (Compania Minera Boliviana,) the nationally owned company that ran the mines. What was left of the army was in disarray. Miner’s militias (and those of Campesinos) were the primary military force in the country. They ruled Bolivia.
Involvement in the management of the mines did not bring about a worker’s utopia. Equipment continued to be primitive and the work was dangerous and exhausting. However, Comibol did keep up the mines and equipment. Miners received a higher pay (about $1 a day) and they and their families received a range of services - hospitals, schools, housing, and electricity. There was a "pulperia" (company store) where things could be purchased against the next months pay. Although the pulperia presented the dangers alluded to in the song "16 Tons" - workers could spend their entire pay in the company store before earning it - it generally sold goods at a reduced rate. When I lived in the mines in the 1960s, you could buy meat flown in from the lowlands for a few cents a pound.
Tension returned to the tin mines as the 1952 revolution unfolded. It cost more to produce tin than it was worth. But while the mines were losing money, miners pressed for higher wages, more benefits, and more employment. Without an army, the MNR was powerless to resist worker demands. The US stepped in to help. With US encouragement, the MNR moved to the right and it began to rebuild the military. By the time I’d arrived in Bolivian mines (1967-69), the military had been restored and René Barrientos, an air force general, was in power. The miners had once again seized the mines, this time declaring them independent nations. In a violent clash, they were defeated by the military and the mines came under martial law.
For the next two decades, the situation in the mines was chaotic. A frustrating stalemate existed; miners no longer had the power to get what they wanted, but their ability to disrupt things gave them a veto over policy. The government and country seemed to yaw and pitch – there were two short-lived, left wing, anti-American dictatorships, Hugo Banzer's right wing, pro-American dictatorship, and seven revolving-door regimes the most notable of which was Garcia-Meza's drug lord dictatorship. Exhausted, Bolivians finally put an elected president in office (Hernan Siles Z.- 1982-85) only to experience the first non-war-related hyperinflation in history. It was a doozy, for a brief period the inflation rate was 60,000% on an annualized basis. An important cog in the economic engine that produced this feat was the need to appease miners.
The second elected government (Victor Paz Estensoro) used a classic, "cold water treatment" to halt the hyperinflation. Among other things, this involved laying off a lot of workers, tightly controlling their wages, and allowing prices to rise freely. When the miners revolted, a state of siege was declared (giving government temporary dictatorial powers) and the miner’s leaders were exiled. One exile was Juan Lechin, Victor Paz’s old MNR partner. When the populace supported the government’s action the power of the mines was broken. This opened the door to change.
Soon, the more profitable mines had been privatized; others were simply closed and their equipment left to rust. It was only in the mid 1990s that miners were allowed to re-enter these mines, now as self-employed "cooperativistas." By this time, the mines were in terrible condition. Equipment and tramlines were unusable. The remaining ore was of low grade and had to be concentrated by hand because there were no longer "engenios" to process it. There was flooding and water in the passageways and beams supporting them were crumbling. The lack of ventilation systems left toxic gases in the tunnels. There were no benefits. The long-past era of Comibol seemed a paradise; working in the mines was now a nightmare.
Why do miners continue to work under such conditions? …Bolivia's economy is in shambles; there are no jobs anywhere.
Jim (and Anne)
| Situations: July 24 - Aug. 19 - Sept. 17 - Nov. 23 |